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WELL, AT LEAST THEY TRIED: DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE AS PRISON OFFICIALS’
LIABILITY SCAPEGOAT FOR OBJECTIVELY
INHUMANE PRISON CONDITIONS DURING
COVID-191
“The Constitution requires that prison officials and governments protect incarcerated people from the inevitable continued spread of Covid-19
behind bars . . . . Some of the 95 percent of people in prisons who have
been left behind have taken to the courts. While their options are generally
to request release or seek improvements to conditions, they face a gauntlet
of legal obstacles to enforce their constitutional rights in federal court.”2
I.

INTRODUCTION

On March 15, 2020, Anthony Cheek—an incarcerated man having
served eighteen years of his twenty-year sentence—suddenly passed out
while in the gym.3 Cheek called his mother only five days prior complaining of flu-like symptoms, but the forty-nine-year-old assured his mother he
was on the mend.4 That was the last time Cheek’s mother ever heard from
her son, as Cheek soon became the first incarcerated person5 to die during
Given the ever-changing nature of the COVID-19 virus, this Note focuses exclusively on
the height of the virus, specifically between March 2020 and January 2021. The rate of infection
and death in prisons decreased dramatically following many states’ issuance of the COVID-19
vaccine in prisons. As such, this Note will not address the conditions of confinement following
the vaccination. For currently up to date statistics on COVID-19 in prisons, please see
https://covidprisonproject.com/.
2 Taryn A. Merkl & Brooks Weinberger, What’s Keeping Thousands in Prison During
Covid-19, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July 22, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/ourwork/research-reports/whats-keeping-thousands-prison-during-covid-19
(describing
cases
brought to federal court resulting from inadequate medical conditions in prison).
3 See Joshua Sharpe & Christian Boone, Ga. inmate dies from COVID-19 as virus hits more
prisons, THE ATL. J.-CONST. (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.ajc.com/news/local/breaking-inmatedies-from-covid-outbreak-worsens-prison/TzQZL4uXfK4GzH9ebSFNQN/ (reporting first incarcerated death during COVID-19).
4 See id. (highlighting conversation between Cheek and mother before Cheek’s death).
5 In conjunction with The Marshall Project’s “The Language Project,” this Note uses the
term “incarcerated persons,” or similar phrases, to refer to individuals currently in confinement.
The Language Project is committed to using language intentionally to prevent the dehumanizing
usage of terms such as “inmate,” “felon,” and “offender,” which define human beings by their
crimes and punishments. See Lawrence Bartley et al., The Language Project, THE MARSHALL
PROJECT, https://www.themarshallproject.org/2021/04/12/the-language-project (last visited Aug.
8, 2021). The Language Project asserts that, “[w]ords like ‘inmate,’ ‘prisoner,’ ‘convict,’ ‘felon’
1
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the COVID-19 pandemic (“COVID-19”).6 At the time of Cheek’s death,
incarcerated persons at Lee State Prison in Georgia were regularly denied
medical treatment for COVID-like symptoms, confined in cells with six
other individuals, given “tiny” cups of anti-bacterial soap sporadically, and
were only required to wear masks discretionarily.7
These types of conditions were not abnormal for detention facilities
during COVID-19; thus, given the rapid deterioration of prison conditions
the pandemic, the 2.12 million8 incarcerated persons in the United States
were routinely subjected to inadequate protection from illness and death
during the height of the virus.9 One incarcerated person writes,
[t]o say that I am concerned about my health is an understatement. I feel trapped and helpless in this prison. No
matter what I do to protect myself. I am at the mercy of
others and can only hope they wear their masks and socially distance. Some [incarcerated persons] follow the rules.

and ‘offender’ are like brands. They reduce human beings to their crimes and cages.” See Lawrence
Bartley,
I
am
Not
Your
‘Inmate’,
THE
MARSHALL
PROJECT,
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2021/04/12/i-am-not-your-inmate (last visited Aug. 8, 2021).
Of note, the author has also altered all quotations in the piece to reflect this language adjustment.
6 See Sharpe & Boone, supra note 3 (noting Cheek’s death as first COVID-19 death).
7 See id. (summarizing incarcerated persons complaints at Lee State Prison). Unsurprisingly,
prison officials actively rejected the “inadequate conditions” narrative incarcerated persons at Lee
State Prison attempted to paint; notably, the Georgia Department of Corrections spokeswoman
pointed to the agency’s website in denying this narrative, indicating that the website said the prison had increased soap supply, halted visitation, and eliminated the typical $5 medical co-pay for
inmates. See id. (providing agency response to incarcerated persons’ complaints).
8 See Countries with the largest number of prisoners per 100,000 of the national population,
as of May 2021, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/262962/countries-with-the-mostprisoners-per-100-000-inhabitants/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2021) (stating number of incarcerated
persons in United States).
9 See The most significant criminal justice policy changes from the COVID-19 pandemic,
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/virus/virusresponse.html (last updated
Nov. 1, 2021) (reviewing jail and prison release conditions in wake of COVID-19 pandemic).
Although many factors contribute to the increasingly worsening state of prisons and jails during
COVID-19, the rapid deterioration and influx of cases in these facilities is often largely attributed
to the concept of “jail churn.” See Local Jails: The real scandal is the churn, PRISON POL’Y
INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/graphs/pie2019_jail_churn.html (last visited Oct. 10,
2021). “Jail Churn” refers to the rapid movement of individuals in and out of jails, largely related
to the United States increased rates of mass incarceration. Id. This consistent introduction and
removal of individuals in jails exposes incarcerated persons to additional modes of contraction,
thereby promoting the rapid spread of COVID-19. Id.
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Some do not. Some don’t care because they are never going home. But I am.10
Other incarcerated persons have commented on the poor living
conditions during COVID-19—which further exacerbated the spread of the
virus regionally—with one person writing to his wife, “I can tell you right
now, with nearly 100% certainty, that I am going to get this virus.”11 He
added that incarcerated persons’ temperatures had not been checked in over
two days, and that even once checked and determined feverish, the sick
remained in dorms with dozens of other incarcerated persons, including
those who were immunocompromised.12 Unfortunately, lack of temperature checks and minimal accommodations for immunocompromised individuals were not the full extent of incarcerated persons’ exposure while
confined.13 Of incarcerated persons’ complaints, they noted that sick and
healthy individuals were often haphazardly mixed, they were periodically
shipped to different facilities without proper testing, they were refused consistent testing practices, healthy individuals were kept in close confinement
with infected persons, and individuals were further exposed to dirty and

10 See Benny Hernandez, Will I Die of Coronavirus Before My Release in 100 Days?,
PRISON WRITERS (emphasis added), https://prisonwriters.com/will-i-die-of-coronavirus/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2020). In his letter he adds:

I hope not to die in the next 145 days. Unfortunately, the possibility of death remains
real. In the event of my demise, I ask that my story be told as an example of everything
we have gotten wrong with mass incarceration policies. And that my death not be in
vain, but serve as a rally cry for those seeking to repair a broken system that routinely
discounts the lives of black and brown people. If I happen to make it to December, I
look forward to joining the fray or voices as we remake and rebuild the criminal justice
system that has too often failed us and our communities.
Id. Hernandez is not alone in his persistent fear of contracting COVID-19—and potential death
due to inadequate protection by prison administrators—calling to attention the need for reform.
See id. (indicating significant agreement among incarcerated persons regarding reform).
11 See Jake Harper, When Prisons Are ‘Petri Dishes,’ Inmates Can’t Guard Against COVID19, They Say, KHN (May 6, 2020), https://khn.org/news/when-prisons-are-petri-dishes-inmatescant-guard-against-covid-19-they-say/ (introducing story of incarcerated person who has been
adversely affected by COVID-19 with little remedy). This incarcerated person is currently suffering from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD)—the third leading cause of death in the
United States—amplifying his constant fear of infection. See id.; see generally Linda Hepler,
COPD
Life
Expectancy
and
Outlook,
HEALTHLINE
(Nov.
7,
2018),
https://www.healthline.com/health/copd/life-expectancy#conclusion (discussing side effects and
complications of COPD).
12 See Harper, supra note 11 (articulating fears of contracting virus based on his current conditions).
13 See id. (introducing problematic prison conditions during COVID-19).
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unhygienic living conditions while confined.14 Despite concerning conditions, however, prisons across the country refused to modify their confinement practices, and further prevented the release of individuals to slow the
spread.15
14 See id. (describing current conditions of confinement as a result of COVID-19). Generally, within prisons, incarcerated persons often complain of dirty and inhumane living conditions.
See Prisons in the United States of America, HUM. RTS. WATCH PRISON PROJECT,
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/advocacy/prisons/u-s.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2021). While this
Note only briefly touches upon the inhumane conditions of confinement, chief complaints among
incarcerated persons consist of overcrowding, violence, and sexual misconduct by incarcerated
persons and prison staff, isolation, mental illness going untreated, and unhygienic conditions. Id.
For instance, incarcerated persons have complained of “bugs swarming their food and showers,
broken and overflowing toilets. . .being forced to sleep on the floor because of overcrowding. . .mold in the showers and cold food on trays that smelled of mildew.” John Seewer, Inmates
sue over what they call inhumane conditions at jail, AP NEWS (Apr. 24, 2019),
https://apnews.com/article/6995620a208245a9a629dbff5ffdd2eb (discussing major complaints
among incarcerated persons). Furthermore, incarcerated persons allege that they are “denied
medication, personal hygiene items, accommodations for disabilities and medical visits.” Id.
“One [incarcerated person] diagnosed with several mental health disorders said he was denied all
of his medication during the first month he was in jail and later received only one of them.” Id.
Additionally, even after being offered medical treatment while incarcerated, incarcerated persons
are also challenged to pay for these services. See The most significant criminal justice policy
changes from the COVID-19 pandemic, supra note 9 (criticizing medical co-pay practice in prisons in various states).

In most states, incarcerated people are expected to pay $2-$5 co-pays for physician visits, medications, and testing in prisons. Because incarcerated people typically earn 14
to 63 cents per hour, these charges are the equivalent of charging a free-world worker
$200 or $500 for a medical visit. The result is to discourage medical treatment and to
put public health at risk. In 2019, some states recognized the harm and eliminated these
co-pays in prisons.
Id. As a result of the unsanitary conditions coupled with relaxed guidelines, incarcerated persons
are not only subjected to higher rates of disease—including COVID-19—but they can also be
outwardly refused medical treatment based on an inability to pay. See id. (noting increased rates
of disease given lack of access to medical care).
15 See Harper, supra note 11 (outlining various state practices regarding release of incarcerated persons during pandemic). Prison Policy Initiative further notes that prisons “[are] releasing
almost no one.” The most significant criminal justice policy changes from the COVID-19 pandemic, supra note 9. Other commentators on the worsening state of prison conditions remark,
Despite advocates’ early calls for a fast reduction of prison and jail populations, a recent study from the ACLU and Prison Policy Initiative found that the measures taken
by governors, prisons officials, prosecutors, and law enforcement have resulted in only
a small overall reduction in the prison population, but there have been larger reductions
in jail populations. Among 49 states, the total prison population has been reduced by
only around 5 percent. The jail population, however, showed a 20 percent median decrease nationwide. But even with people being released, safe social distancing in jail or
prison is virtually impossible. And all states have failed to adequately implement policies necessary to prevent the transmission of Covid-19 among their incarcerated populations and staff.
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As a result of the inhumane prison conditions maintained by prison
administrators during the height of the virus, the rate of both infection and
death for incarcerated persons and prison staff significantly increased between March 2020 and January 2021.16 From March 2020 through January
2021, 366,121 incarcerated persons and prison staff tested positive for
COVID-19, with 2,314 of these cases resulting in death.17 In December of
2020, over four times as many incarcerated persons in the U.S. had
COVID-19 as compared to the general population; this resulted in 1 in 5
incarcerated persons infected, while only 1 in 20 members of the general
population infected.18 The rate of infection showed few signs of decreasing
during the height of the virus, with the positive test rates increasing by
roughly 3% each week.19 The same extended to the death rate of incarcerated persons, with the death rate increasing by 4% over one week.20 Federal prisons experienced the highest number of deaths, reporting over 200

Merkl & Weinberger, supra note 2; see also Claudia Deane et al., A Year of U.S. Public Opinion
on
the
Coronavirus
Pandemic,
PEW
RES.
CTR.
(Mar.
5,
2021),
https://www.pewresearch.org/2021/03/05/a-year-of-u-s-public-opinion-on-the-coronaviruspandemic/ (indicating public concern for conditions of confinement during COVID-19); Laura
Crimaldi, Advocates ask court to release inmates as COVID-19 sweeps through state prisons,
BOSTON
GLOBE
(Dec.
24,
2020
1:17
PM),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/12/24/metro/advocates-ask-court-release-inmates-covid-19sweeps-through-state-prisons/ (suggesting worsening conditions require change in prison practices).
16 See Keri Blakinger & Keegan Hamilton, “I Begged Them To Let Me Die”: How Federal
Prisons Became Coronavirus Death Traps, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (June 18, 2020, 7:00 AM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/06/18/i-begged-them-to-let-me-die-how-federalprisons-became-coronavirus-death-traps (describing increased rate of infection in prisons due to
poor response); see also Kim Bellware, Prisoners and guards agree about federal coronavirus
response:
“We
do
not
feel
safe”,
WASH.
POST
(Aug.
24,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/08/24/prisoners-guards-agree-about-federalcoronavirus-response-we-do-not-feel-safe/ (discussing prison staff effects of COVID-19).
17 See Katie Parker & Tom Meagher, A State-by-State Look at 15 Months of Coronavirus in
Prisons, THE MARSHALL PROJECT, https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/05/01/a-state-bystate-look-at-coronavirus-in-prisons (last updated July 1, 2021) (recording and updating data on
COVID-19 infection rates in federal and state correctional facilities). To illustrate the rapid nature of infection, between October 2020 and January 2021, the total number of infected incarcerated persons increased from 161,349 to 366,121. Id.
18 See Beth Schwartzapfel et al., 1 in 5 Prisoners in the U.S. has had COVID-19, THE
MARSHALL
PROJECT
(Dec.
18,
2020,
6:00
AM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/12/18/1-in-5-prisoners-in-the-u-s-has-had-covid-19
(discussing inequities in prisons leading to increased rate of infection); see also Giles Clark, 1 in
5 prisoners in the U.S. has had COVID and 1,700 have died, CNBC (Dec. 18, 2020, 6:31 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/1-in-5-prisoners-in-the-us-has-had-covid-and-1700-have-died.html (commenting on disproportionate COVID rate of infection for incarcerated persons).
19 See Schwartzapfel, supra note 18 (providing statistical data relating to rate of infection and
deaths of incarcerated persons).
20 See id. (confirming death rate among incarcerated persons during COVID-19).
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deaths between March 2020 and January 2021.21 Similarly, every state—
with the exception of Vermont—reported incarcerated deaths from
COVID-19 during the height of the virus.22 Of these states, Nevada and
New Mexico had the highest rate of death, with both states averaging 43
deaths per 10,000 incarcerated persons in January 2021.23
These numbers resulted in higher likelihoods of infection, with incarcerated persons being 5.5 times more likely to contract COVID-19 and
3.3 times more likely to die from the virus, as compared to those who were
not incarcerated.24 In addition to causing higher COVID-19 infection rates
in correctional facilities, the willful ignorance with regard to incarcerated
persons’ health and safety also increased the rate of infection in surrounding neighborhoods.25 Despite these alarming rates of infection among incarcerated persons and prison staff, the only recourse for incarcerated persons seeking adequate medical care required meeting the Eighth

See id. (illustrating state-by-state review of COVID-19 in detention facilities). Interestingly, amidst COVID-19, the Federal Bureau of Prisons changed their policies relating to reporting
incarcerated deaths in jails and prisons. Beath Healy, As Feds Change Rules For Reporting Jail
Deaths,
Sheriffs
Face
Less
Accountability,
WBUR
(Jan.
21,
2021),
https://www.wbur.org/news/2021/01/21/jails-deaths-in-custody-reporting-change (remarking on
change in BOP policy and adverse effects on incarcerated persons). Under the new policy, the
Bureau of Justice Assistance rather than the Bureau of Justice Statistics will track incarcerated
deaths, sheriffs and prison officials will report deaths to the medical examiner’s office rather than
directly to the Department of Justice, and sheriffs will no longer have to file reports on incarcerated persons who die at the hospital. Id. These new policies have minimized sheriff accountability, as well as provided deference to prison officials on when to report to medical examiners. Id.
In one Massachusetts case, an incarcerated person died due to COVID complications in April;
however, the medical examiner was not notified until June 5th—a month after the incarcerated
person was buried. Id.
22 See Schwartzapfel, supra note 18 (mentioning equally alarming infection and death rates
in state prison facilities).
23 See Parker & Meagher, supra note 17 (providing infographics charting infection rate by
state).
24 See Alexandra Sternlicht, Prisoners 550% More Likely to Get Covid-19, 300% More Likely
to
Die,
New
Study
Shows,
FORBES
(July
8,
2020,
5:35
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/alexandrasternlicht/2020/07/08/prisoners-550-more-likely-to-getcovid-19-300-more-likely-to-die-new-study-shows/?sh=7367f3593a72 (discussing recent data
revealed by UCLA prison study). “Close confinement, limited PPE and increased risk of cardiac
and respiratory conditions makes prison populations especially vulnerable to coronavirus, says
the report.” Id.
25 See Michael Ollove, How COVID-19 in Jails and Prisons Threatens Nearby Communities,
PEW
(July
1,
2020),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2020/07/01/how-covid-19-in-jails-and-prisons-threatens-nearbycommunities (presenting increased infection rates among populations in nearby areas of prisons
with high COVID-19 rates).
21
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Amendment’s stringent deliberate indifference standard—a near impossible
feat—thereby resulting in a lack of any sufficient remedy.26
In order to address alleged inhumane medical conditions while
confined, incarcerated persons must raise an Eighth Amendment cruel and
unusual punishment claim, arguing that prison officials were “deliberately
indifferent” to their serious medical needs.27 To make this determination,
courts will apply a two-pronged deliberate indifference test, requiring an
objective and subjective assessment of the prison officials’ conduct.28 This
two-pronged test, however, has created an inconsistent and arbitrary deliberate indifference standard, effectuating a near impossible burden for incarcerated persons to overcome.29 As a result of the inconsistent application
of this standard throughout federal courts, incarcerated persons are yet
again presented with an additional barrier.30 Through review of historical
and modern Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, this Note seeks to assess the
federal courts’ approach to the deliberate indifference standard when evaluating prison conditions—particularly during unprecedented public health
emergencies.31 After a review of current practices, this Note will propose a
new standard for the deliberate indifference test, one that abolishes its subjective element and instead requires an exclusively objective analysis.32

26 See The most significant criminal justice policy changes from the COVID-19 pandemic,
supra note 9 (analyzing lack of response and its implications). The Eighth Amendment requires
both an objective and subjective showing of deliberate indifference, meaning that incarcerated
persons must offer evidence of a prison official’s “actual knowledge” of the serious medical condition; this often results in a “he said, she said” scenario between incarcerated persons and prison
officials. See sources cited infra notes 63-69 and accompanying text (discussing subjective and
objective elements of Eighth Amendment test). As discussed in the foregoing pages, this creates
an impossible burden for incarcerated persons, requiring evidence of a subjective disregard for
human life, despite objectively inhumane conditions and treatment. See sources cited infra notes
150-163 and accompanying text (considering practicality of deliberate indifference test). This is
particularly difficult given the recency of COVID-19 and the lack of consensus as to appropriate
responses. See sources cited infra note 164-166 and accompanying text (mentioning difficulties
of subjective standard during a novel disease).
27 See 1 CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT – ITS DIVISIONS,
AGENCIES AND OFFICERS § 7:69. INADEQUATE MEDICAL CARE – DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
STANDARD (2021) (describing requirements of Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement
requirements).
28 See id. (elaborating further on courts’ analyses of deliberate indifference standard).
29 See Merkl & Weinberger, supra note 2 (noting difficulties in proving deliberate indifference under subjective standard based on Supreme Court precedent).
30 See INADEQUATE MEDICAL CARE – DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE STANDARD, supra note
27 (outlining inconsistent practices in applying standard among circuit courts).
31 See sources cited infra notes 33-43 and accompanying text (providing historical overview
of Eighth Amendment).
32 See INADEQUATE MEDICAL CARE – DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE STANDARD, supra note
27 (adding that removal of a subjective analysis will provide for more equitable results).
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II. HISTORY

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides,
“[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”33 Generally, the Eighth
Amendment seeks to prevent government officials from issuing punishments that are “barbaric” or severely disproportionate to the crime committed.34 Despite this general assessment of the Amendment, the Supreme
Court has often referenced the difficulty in properly defining its scope, with
Justice Burger noting, “of all our fundamental guarantees, the ban on ‘cruel
and unusual punishments’ is one of the most difficult to translate into judicially manageable terms.”35 As such, the historical origins and development are particularly acute in defining the Amendment’s scope today.36
A.

British Protections and Formative American History

The concept of protection against cruel and unusual punishment
dates long before the founding of the U.S. Constitution, with roots in early
British governmental structure.37 Following the tyrannical leadership of
King James II in England, the English Parliament ratified a declaration of
rights that provided “nor cruell and unusuall Punishments inflicted.”38
Many scholars argue that the inclusion of this language largely stemmed
from the trial of Titus Oates, in which the government sought to limit postconviction sentences.39 However, other scholars suggest that historical evSee U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added) (providing protections against cruel and
unusual punishment).
34 See Micah Schwartzbach, The Meaning of “Cruel and Unusual Punishment,” NOLO,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/the-meaning-cruel-unusual-punishment.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2021) (discussing overarching purpose of Eighth Amendment).
35 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 376 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (noting difficulties in applying Eighth Amendment standards); see also Celia Rumann, Tortured History:
Finding Our Way Back to the Lost Origins of the Eighth Amendment, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 661, 665
(2004) (discussing Supreme Court’s inability to properly define Eighth Amendment protections).
36 See Schwartzbach, supra note 34 (suggesting Eighth Amendment’s historical roots require
more in-depth interpretation).
37 See Rumann, supra note 35, at 670 (discussing British origins of Eighth Amendment in
U.S. Constitution).
38 See id. (providing context for introduction of Eighth Amendment and prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishment).
39 See id. at 670-71 (indicating trial of Titus Oates as formative event in Eighth Amendment
adoption). Titus Oates was convicted in 1685 for perjury that led to numerous executions of people Oates wrongfully accused. See id. at 668-71; see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,
969 (1991) (presenting historical origins of Eighth Amendment principles); John D. Bessler, A
Century In The Making: The Glorious Revolution, The American Revolution, And The Origins of
the Constitution’s Eight Amendment, 27 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 989, 1018-19 (2019) (de33
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idence points towards inclusion of this language as an effort to prevent torturous methods used to extract confessions.40
Predominantly inspired by the English Bill of Rights, Virginia
adopted a similar punishment provision in the Virginia Declaration of
Rights in 1776.41 As much of the U.S. Constitution was influenced by the
colonies’ independent constitutions, Virginia’s inclusion of a cruel and unusual punishment clause resulted in the addition of the Eighth Amendment
to the federal Bill of Rights during the Constitutional Convention.42 Since
the Bill of Rights’ adoption, the Supreme Court has wrestled with determining whether prison conditions, specifically confinement, are considered
“punishment” under the Eighth Amendment.43

scribing trial of Titus Oates and its Eighth Amendment influences). As a result of Oates’ perjury,
over twelve Catholic men were executed, and Oates was coined, “the Blackest of Villains that
ever lived upon the face of the Earth.” See Bessler, supra, at 1018. However, the judge in Oates’
case feared the implications of an execution, considering that a death imposition may deter even
honest witnesses from testifying in later cases. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 970. As a result, Oates
was sentenced to imprisonment and an annual public whipping while tied to a moving cart, along
with numerous other barbaric punishments. See Bessler, supra, at 1021-22. Despite the severity
of Oates’ conduct, his punishments are still cited for their barbarity in contemporary Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 390 (1910) (discussing scope and power of Eighth Amendment originating from Titus Oates); Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 665 (1977) (noting “exclusive concern of English version was conduct of
judges enforcing criminal law”); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 274 n.17 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (explaining English provision was intended to restrain the judicial and executive
power).
40 See Rumann, supra note 35, at 668-70 (considering historical intent of language proposed
in Eighth Amendment).
41 See id. at 670 (introducing Virginia’s influence on construction and implementation of
Eighth Amendment).
42 See id. (outlining timeline for adoption of Eighth Amendment in Bill of Rights). Historically, the inclusion of the Eighth Amendment was also proposed by Virginia during the Virginia
Convention, which ratified the U.S. Constitution in 1788. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT
RIGHTS OF MANKIND: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BILL OF RIGHTS 170 (Rowman & Littlefield 1992). Two notable Virginians, George Mason and Patrick Henry, were loud advocates for
the inclusion of a cruel and unusual punishment limitation on Congress. See JOHN
PATTERSON, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: POLITICS, RELIGION, AND THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE 84 (2004).
Henry added, “[w]hat has distinguished our ancestors?—That they would not admit of tortures, or
cruel and barbarous punishment. But Congress may introduce the practice of the civil law, in
preference to that of the common law. They may introduce the practice of France, Spain, and
Germany. . . .” See Debate in Virginia Ratifying Convention, THE FOUNDER’S CONST.,
https://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendVIIIs13.html (last visited Oct. 21,
2021).
43 See Jeffrey D. Bukowski, The Eighth Amendment and Original Intent: Applying the Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment to Prison Deprivation Cases is Not Beyond the
Bounds of History and Precedent, 99 DICK. L. REV. 419, 419 (1994) (rejecting Justice Thomas’
assertion that conditions of confinement are outside bounds of Eighth Amendment protection).
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B.

Current Eighth Amendment Interpretations: Evolving Standards of
Decency

As noted by Justice Burger above, defining the scope of what constitutes a “cruel” and “unusual” punishment under the Eighth Amendment
has been particularly difficult for federal courts.44 In 1910, the Supreme
Court recognized that “[w]hat constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment
has not been exactly decided.”45 The Supreme Court has grappled with the
term “unusual,” having difficulty applying the logic that even if a punishment is inhumane, it may be permissible if it is deemed a “normal” punishment.46 The Court has since excluded the interpretation of “unusual” in
its caselaw, suggesting that the term may have been unintentionally added
to the Amendment by the Framers.47
Today, the Court is left to determine what constitutes “cruel” under
the Eighth Amendment, especially in light of historical punishments that
are now seen as inhumane to contemporary society.48 While many Justices
differ, in 1958, the Court adopted an “evolving standards of decency” test,
with Justice Burger holding that the cruel and unusual punishment clause
“must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society.”49 In applying the “evolving standards
of decency” test, the court assesses the proposed punishment by reviewing
both objective and subjective indicia.50 The “objective indicia” prong re-

See Schwartzbach, supra note 34 (mentioning historical difficulties in interpreting terms
“cruel” and “unusual” together).
45 See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910) (acknowledging holes in Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence); see also Schwartzbach, supra note 34 (reviewing early discussions of
Eighth Amendment).
46 See Schwartzbach, supra note 34 (outlining Court’s difficulties in defining term “unusual”).
47 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 331 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (reiterating
term “unusual” was inadvertently included in English Bill of Rights); see also Schwartzbach, supra note 34 (commenting on early theories of Eighth Amendment interpretation).
48 See Schwartzbach, supra note 34 (reviewing historical backdrop of Eighth Amendment
tests).
49 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (introducing restructuring of Eighth
Amendment analysis); see also Schwartzbach, supra note 34 (discussing new Eighth Amendment
test).
50 See William W. Berry III, Evolved Standards, Evolving Justices? The Case for a Broader
Application of the Eighth Amendment, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 105, 117 (2018) (explaining scope of
evolving standards of decency test). In adopting this test, the Court placed significant emphasis
on judicial deference to states and allowing state legislatures to determine appropriate punishments. See id. at 116 (outlining history of deference to state legislatures for Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence). One scholar argues that this deference was likely afforded to states following the
Furman decision, where the Supreme Court faced severe backlash for outlawing the death penalty
rather than affording states the opportunity to make that determination themselves. See id. at 117.
44
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quires the court review societal consensus, namely the number of state and
federal governments that permit the punishment.51 The “subjective indicia”
prong utilizes the Court’s “own judgment,” whereby Justices assess whether the use of punishment at issue may be justified by any theory of punishment (retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation).52 Justices
place an emphasis on proportionality in their assessments, determining
whether they believe that “the punishment is excessive in light of the characteristics of the offender and nature of the crime.”53
Conversely, originalists on the Court have attempted to interpret
the Eighth Amendment as limited to punishments that were historically unacceptable because of their “inherent brutality.”54 Despite this proposed
historical approach, the Court has remained consistent with its adherence to
This background has prompted the Court to adopt the evolving standards of decency test, as it
allows for an acknowledgment of state practices. See id.
51 See id. at 116 (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-17 (2002)) (describing what
Court will review to determine objective indicia). The author notes that this has seemingly resulted in the practice of simply counting the number of state jurisdictions that authorize the punishment, and if less than half authorize the punishment, then it is often considered not in accordance with societal standards. Id. The Court has also incorporated international norms in their
considerations, but this is frequently met with backlash by originalist Justices. See id. at n.58; see
also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 625-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing improper use of
international norms in Eighth Amendment analysis).
52 See Berry, supra note 50, at 117 (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977))
(providing “subjective indicia” analysis utilized by the Court).
53 See id. at 118 (citing Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008)) (indicating theories of
punishment most utilized by the Court, particularly proportionality). Under this test, the Court
has deemed unconstitutional the death penalty for “rapes, for some felony murder crimes, or
where the offender is intellectually disabled or a juvenile.” See id. (listing unconstitutional punishments under evolving standards of decency test).
54 See Schwartzbach, supra note 34 (introducing originalist approach to Eighth Amendment
analysis); see also John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 N.W. U. L. REV. 1739, 1742 (2008) (remarking on Scalia’s approach to Eighth Amendment assessments as prohibiting “only certain inherently cruel
forms of punishment”). Many scholars, in following an originalist interpretation to the Constitution, argue that the “evolving standards of decency” test promotes far too much inconsistency in
the Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. See Stinneford, supra, at 1741.
The Court’s decisions with respect to the death penalty have been no more consistent
than its non-death penalty proportionality jurisprudence. In Stanford v. Kentucky, for
example, the Court ruled that execution of sixteen-or seventeen-year-old murderers
was not cruel and unusual punishment per se. Sixteen years later, in Roper v. Simmons,
the Court ruled that it was. Similarly, in Penry v. Lynaugh, the Court held that execution of the mentally retarded was not necessarily cruel and unusual. Thirteen years later, in Atkins v. Virginia, the Court held that it was. As these results indicate, in recent
decades, the Supreme Court’s prior decisions as to the scope and application of the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause have been poor indicators of what the Court
will do in the future.
Id. (emphasis added) (critiquing inconsistent application of evolving standards of decency test).
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the evolving standards of decency test, oftentimes applying modern public
opinion to its Eighth Amendment interpretations.55 Thus, in applying
Eighth Amendment protections today, the Court has placed a particular
emphasis on ensuring that basic dignity, considering the time period, is respected.56
C.

The Eighth Amendment in Prisons: The Court’s Construction of the
“Deliberate Indifference” Test

The Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has frequently evolved over time, periodically widening its latitude to restrict inhumane practices by government officials.57 The Supreme Court has been
expansive in their definition of punishment, determining that the scope of
the Eighth Amendment may extend beyond the mere infliction of punishment, and instead holding that the Eighth Amendment may also be implicated based on the conditions of confinement.58 Unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court has qualified this expansion, noting that “harsh conditions of
confinement may constitute cruel and unusual punishment, unless such
conditions are a part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.”59

55 See, e.g., Coker, 433 U.S. at 597 (holding death penalty as punishment for rape unconstitutional because only one state authorized that sentence); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-12 (holding death
penalty for intellectually disabled unconstitutional based on modern trend); Roper, 543 U.S. at
578 (holding death penalty for minors unconstitutional based on trend towards death penalty abolition).
56 See Schwartzbach, supra note 34 (assessing importance of context and time period in
Eighth Amendment analyses).
57 See id. at 424-29 (establishing jurisprudential history of Eighth Amendment claims).
58 See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (expanding scope of Eighth Amendment to consider conditions of punishment); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87 (1978) (incorporating conditions of confinement into deliberate indifference assessment); Brown v. Plata,
563 U.S. 493, 511 (2011) (finding extreme prison overcrowding warrants judicial remedy under
Eighth Amendment); see also Bukowski, supra note 43, at 424-25 (introducing Eighth Amendment’s expanded scope under Estelle); Joel H. Thompson, Today’s Deliberate Indifference:
Providing Attention Without Providing Treatment to Prisoners with Serious Medical Needs, 45
HARV. CIV. LIB. L. REV. 635, 637 (2010) (laying out Estelle and Farmer progression under
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence). The Supreme Court further emphasized the Eighth Amendment’s protection of incarcerated persons, holding that conditions of incarceration are distinct
from punishments in a school setting. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669-70 (1977) (affirming principles established in Estelle); see also Bukowski, supra note 43, at 425 (discussing
jurisprudential progression of incarcerated person’s conditions of confinement).
59 See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (emphasis added) (cleaned up) (providing
exception to conditions of confinement protections). The Court continues to emphasize that
Eighth Amendment protections are relaxed in the prison context, stating that “[a]fter incarceration, only the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ . . . constitutes cruel and unusual pun-
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In defining what would constitute an Eighth Amendment violation
based on conditions of confinement, the Court determined that prison officials’ conduct must demonstrate “deliberate indifference” to the serious
medical needs of incarcerated persons, holding that mere negligence alone
is not enough.60 Despite its commitment to protection against inadequate
prison conditions, the Supreme Court ruled that prison officials must inflict
“unnecessary or wanton” pain to constitute cruel and unusual punishment.61
The Court continued to refine this interpretation, holding that prison officials will only violate the Eighth Amendment when their conduct is malicious with the purpose of causing harm, and that lack of due care for an incarcerated person’s interests or safety is not enough to warrant remedy. 62
The Supreme Court subsequently worked to define the requisite
standards under the newly proposed “deliberate indifference” test, including determining whether an objective or subjective assessment of a prison
official’s conduct would be appropriate.63 In the seminal Farmer v. Brennan,64 the Supreme Court set forth the two-pronged test to be applied to
Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims, including the use of
both an objective and subjective analysis.65 Under this test, a prison official will be held liable under either § 1983 or Bivens for violations of the
Eighth Amendment when the plaintiff establishes: (1) there was an objectively serious medical need; and (2) prison officials were deliberately indifishment . . . .” See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 670 (emphasis added) (describing scope of Eighth
Amendment protections in prison).
60 See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319 (noting Eighth Amendment requires “more than ordinary lack
of due care for the [incarcerated person’s] interests or safety.”)
61 See Ingraham, 430 U.S. 651 at 669-70 (establishing unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain threshold); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981) (holding double celling does not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment without unnecessary or wanton pain).
62 See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 324 (holding that prison official’s intentional shooting of incarcerated person during riot was not cruel and unusual). Affording prison administrators significant
deference when security risks are implicated, the Court in Whitley concluded that even though
prison officials could have handled the response better, there was no “wantonness” necessary to
offend the Eighth Amendment. Id. “The infliction of pain in the course of a prison security
measure, therefore, does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment simply because it may appear in retrospect that the degree of force authorized or applied for security purposes was unreasonable, and hence unnecessary in the strict sense.” Id. at 319.
63 See Bukowski, supra note 43, at 427 (discussing Court’s shift to include objective and
subjective analysis).
64 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 826 (1994) (stating court’s disposition).
65 See id. at 836 (outlining use of two-prong deliberate indifference test). Farmer dealt with
a preoperative transsexual with feminine characteristics incarcerated in a male prison who alleged, among other things, that the prison official’s failure to segregate her resulted in her subsequent rape and beatings, thereby making prison officials liable for deliberate indifference. Id. at
829. The plaintiff in Farmer asserted that the prison officials were deliberately indifferent because they were aware of the facility’s violent tendencies and that the plaintiff would be susceptible to attack based on her particular characteristics. Id.
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ferent to that need.66 As to the second prong, the Supreme Court thereafter
held that deliberate indifference must be assessed subjectively; the court
determined that objectively inhumane prisons conditions are not enough to
establish liability, but rather, the Court must review the prison official’s
state of mind.67 Consequently, the Supreme Court noted that even obvious
risks will not implicate a prison official, so long as the prison official was
not subjectively aware of the risk.68 Therefore, as a result of this ruling,
prison officials whom the Supreme Court Justices deem to have acted “reasonably” in response to a risk may still avoid liability under the Eighth
Amendment.69
D.

Relevant Prerequisite Hurdles to an Eighth Amendment Claim: §
1983, Bivens, and the PLRA

While the Eighth Amendment is explicit in its protections against
inhumane treatment, incarcerated persons must first surpass a series of hurdles before properly asserting a meritorious Eighth Amendment analysis in
federal court.70

See id. at 837 (laying out Eighth Amendment test). Depending on whether an incarcerated
person is in state or federal prison, in order to reach this Eighth Amendment test, an incarcerated
person must first allege a § 1983 (state or local prison) or Bivens (federal) claim alleging that a
state or federal official violated their Eighth Amendment rights while acting “under the color of
law.” See sources cited infra notes 71, 75 and accompanying text (describing initial bases for
raising Eighth Amendment violations).
67 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838 (discussing necessity of subjective test for deliberate indifference).
68 See id. (adding detail to use of subjective test). The Court in Farmer elaborated further by
adding that a prison official cannot be required to “anticipate” victims, and that even plaintiffs
who are especially susceptible to injury will not alter the Court’s requirement that a prison official
must be aware of the risk. Id. at 844. Moreover, the Farmer Court provided additional scapegoats for prison officials, as they articulated that prison officials who were aware of the risk to
incarcerated persons may still escape liability if they can show that they “respond[ed] reasonably
to a risk, even if the harm was not ultimately avoided.” See id. (elaborating on prison official’s
liability in this context).
69 See id. (adding prison official’s duty is to ensure “reasonable safety”). The Court rejected
the plaintiff’s argument that a subjective test would “unjustly” require physical injury prior to
suit, holding that incarcerated persons may still seek injunctions under the subjective test, and that
this test does not require an injury to occur prior to suit. Id. at 845; see also Brief for the Petitioner, Farmer, 511 U.S. 825, No. 92-7247 (Nov. 16, 1993) (introducing physical injury requirement to court). Some commentators have critiqued the use of a subjective analysis within this
context, arguing that “[t]he conditions of a[n] [incarcerated person]’s confinement are part of his
punishment regardless of a prison official’s state of mind.” See Jason D. Sanabria, Note and
Comment, Farmer v. Brennan: Do Prisoners Have Any Rights Left Under the Eighth Amendment?, 16 WHITTIER L. REV. 1113, 1142-43 (1995).
70 See sources cited infra notes 75-83 and accompanying text (providing several instances of
procedural hurdles for incarcerated litigants).
66
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To pursue an Eighth Amendment violation by state or local actors
in federal court, incarcerated persons must first raise a § 1983 civil rights
claim, which holds state and local government officials working “under the
color of law” tortiously liable for violations of “immunities secured by the
Constitution.”71 Practically, though, § 1983 serves as a procedural device,
giving claimants jurisdiction to bring civil rights suits against state and local actors in federal court.72 Since it is a procedural device, however, allegations are ancillary in nature, that is, claimants must allege a violation of
another federal law in order to obtain relief.73 Further, § 1983 claims apply
exclusively to state and local actors, and do not typically reach federal officials unless they act alongside state or local officials.74
However, if a federal prison official was acting independently, incarcerated persons instead must raise a Bivens claim.75 Similar to § 1983
claims, a Bivens claim is a civil rights lawsuit, holding federal officials
“acting under the color of authority” personally liable for violations of constitutional rights, such as the Eighth Amendment.76 However, in obtaining
71 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (laying out liability for federal officials who violate protected
rights). In addition, the term “color of law” has often raised significant discourse among federal
courts. See Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 277 n.1 (2002) (declining to review
whether petitioners acted “under color of state law”). Ultimately, “under color of law” has most
often been interpreted to hold government actors liable when they act with the power “possessed
by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with
the authority of state law.” See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (defining “under the color
of law” for deliberate indifference). Thus, police officers and prison officials will be acting “under the color of law” when acting within the scope of their employment. Id.
72 See Martin A. Schwartz & Kathryn R. Urbonya, Section 1983 Litigation, FED. JUD. CTR.,
7-8 (2008), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/Sec19832.pdf. Historically, § 1983 was
adopted under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, seeking to provide freed slaves the opportunity to
bring suit against southern law enforcement officials in federal court, avoiding biases likely present in state courts. Id. at 1-2. Thus, the federal government adopted § 1983 exclusively as a
procedural remedy, hoping to provide freed slaves the opportunity to address civil rights claims in
a more impartial court. Id. at 2-3; see also Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 485 (1982) (detailing historical adoption
of § 1983).
73 See Schwartz & Urbonya, supra note 72, at 7-8 (explaining functional and procedural use
of § 1983 claims).
74 See Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963) (holding § 1983 claims do not apply
to federal officials); Tongol v. Usery, 601 F.2d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding federal officials liable under § 1983 when working alongside state actor).
75 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
397 (1971) (holding federal officials may be liable for monetary damages resulting from violation
of constitutional tort).
76 See id. at 389 (describing appropriateness of monetary damages against federal officials
where cause of action is proven). Bivens claims were adopted to provide relief for litigants where
negligent acts by government officials were not covered by the Federal Torts Claims Act
(FTCA). See id. at 392 (offering Bivens as additional source of remedy where FTCA will not
apply); see also Federal Torts Claim Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (providing relief only where the ac-
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its basis through common law, Bivens claims are implied causes of actions,
meaning incarcerated persons must demonstrate that there is no other statutory remedy available for their claim.77 In addition, since it is an implied
cause of action, courts have upheld the discretionary authority to refuse to
imply a cause of action if there are other concerns, such as national security
considerations.78
In another series of hurdles, even after alleging inadequate confinement under the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment,
based on either § 1983 or Bivens, incarcerated persons must further meet
the stringent requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”).79
Notably, Congress adopted the PLRA in response to the surplus of § 1983
claims, with its overall purpose to avoid “meritless” incarcerated person
lawsuits.80 Much like several other litigation prerequisites, the PLRA requires incarcerated persons to first exhaust all administrative remedies prior
to bringing a claim in federal court.81 Having surpassed the base-level
PLRA requirements, incarcerated persons may allege civil complaints in
tion is brought against the United States). Bivens actions are not prohibited by the federal government’s “sovereign immunity” doctrine because the officials are acting in their personal capacities and are therefore not considered “the United States.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (“Any civil
action against the United States” (emphasis added)).
77 See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 374-75 (1983) (holding Civil Service Reform Act permitted statutory remedy for wrongful termination by federal agencies).
78 See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1861 (2017) (holding Bivens did not extend to
Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment claims). The Court has also refused to acknowledge a Bivens claim
when injuries were suffered during military service. See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305
(1983) (holding enlisted military service members cannot bring Bivens actions against their superior officers).
79 See 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (articulating process for incarcerated persons to adjudicate claims in
federal court). Typically, in § 1983 and Bivens claims, there are no exhaustion requirements. See
id. However, because incarcerated persons have been subjected to the PLRA, they have to overcome an additional hurdle before their civil rights claims may be redressed in court. See id.
80 See Ethan Rubin, Comment, Unknowable Remedies: Albino v. Baca, The PLRA Exhaustion Requirement, and the Problem of Notice, 56 B.C. L. REV. E-SUPPLEMENT 151, 151 (2015)
(introducing context of PLRA adoption). This comment further discusses the inequities surrounding the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, noting that the administrative exhaustion requirement applies to all incarcerated persons regardless of whether they have been notified of this requirement. Id.
81 See 42 U.S.C. 1997(e) (describing requirement for exhaustion of administrative remedies);
18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(A)(i)-(ii) (refusing prison release orders unless administrative remedies
exhaustion); see also Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1857 (2016) (holding available remedies
prevent incarcerated persons from bringing claim in court). This requirement has also been applied arbitrarily during the COVID-19 pandemic, with some courts claiming that the exhaustion
requirement is disregarded because of the severe circumstances of the pandemic, whereas others
contend that an exhaustion of administrative remedies remains necessary. See McPherson v. Lamont, 457 F. Supp. 3d 67, 81 (D. Conn. 2020) (holding COVID-19 risks are so dire that exhaustion requirement is not necessary); see also Blake, 136 S. Ct. at 1857 (holding “special circumstances” do not preclude incarcerated persons from meeting exhaustion requirement).
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federal courts.82 Thus, before incarcerated persons may even address the
requisite analysis under the Eighth Amendment, they must first convince a
federal court that they have met the exhaustive requirements in the PLRA,
among others, and that they have sufficient basis under either § 1983 or
Bivens.83
E.

Deference to Prison Administrators and Its Added Burden on
Incarcerated Litigants

While litigating, incarcerated persons are next challenged to overcome the long-held deference afforded to prison administrators by the
Court.84 The Supreme Court has maintained that “[p]rison administrators . . . should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.”85
Not only does this deference exist, but subsequent Supreme Court cases
have instructed that this deference be “substantial,” providing prison administrators with the ability to “defin[e] legitimate goals of corrections systems and determin[e] most appropriate means to accomplish them.”86
This general standard has been extended to deliberate indifference
cases, with the Supreme Court specifically recognizing the competing interests of Eighth Amendment protections for incarcerated persons and security risks in prisons.87 The Court, in fact, emphasizes just how important
See 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (providing implications of failure to meet requirements of PLRA).
See sources cited supra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing exhaustion requirements under PLRA).
84 See sources cited infra notes 85-90 and accompanying text (commenting on substantial
deference afforded to prison administrators).
85 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547-48 (1979) (introducing concept of deference to
prison administrators).
86 See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003) (holding “legitimate penological interests” were alleged by restricting visitation of children to prison). The Court in Overton discusses
the four key factors in evaluating prison regulations and whether they would pass constitutional
scrutiny, namely: (1) “whether the regulation has a ‘valid, rational connection’ to a legitimate
governmental interest;” (2) “whether alternative means are open to [incarcerated persons] to exercise the asserted right;” (3) “what impact an accommodation of the right would have on guards
and [incarcerated persons] and prison resources;” and (4) “whether there are ‘ready alternatives’
to the regulation.” Id. at 132; see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987) (establishing
four-factor test utilized in assessing prison regulations and appropriate deference).
87 See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21 (discussing balancing interests between incarcerated persons and prison officials in Eighth Amendment context). The Court adopted a new test under
Whitley regarding disturbances and deliberate indifference, stating that
82
83

[w]here a prison security measure is undertaken to resolve a disturbance . . . we think
the question whether the measure taken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suf-
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deference to prison administrators is, stating, “a deliberate indifference
standard does not adequately capture the importance of such competing obligations, or convey the appropriate hesitancy to critique in hindsight decisions necessarily made in haste, under pressure, and frequently without the
luxury of a second chance.”88
In facing these series of hurdles, incarcerated persons will be required to surpass the Supreme Court’s explicit trust in prison administrators’ decisions regarding safety.89 Incarcerated persons will thus face a final presumption against them when arguing the merits of their claim, in
addition to an already challenging subjective element to establish under the
deliberate indifference test.90
F.

Final PLRA Limitations on Relief

Finally, even if incarcerated persons somehow manage to surpass
the above hurdles, incarcerated persons again must return to the PLRA, as
it provides applicable limitations on available relief for individuals.91 The
PLRA provides that any federal court prospective relief order that results
from an incarcerated person’s successful deliberate indifference claim must
be “narrowly drawn” and be the “least intrusive means necessary” to correct prison officials’ apparent violation.92 The rule also adds that “[t]he
fering ultimately turns on ‘whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain
or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing
harm.
Id.
See id. at 320 (reviewing appropriate deference in a deliberate indifference setting).
See Alicia Bianco, Article, Prisoners’ Fundamental Right to Read: Courts Should Ensure
that Rational Basis is Truly Rational, 21 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1, 19 (2016) (arguing “the
level of deference afforded to prison administrators causes the purported balancing test in Turner
to be heavily slanted against [incarcerated persons].”) Notably, this deference also extends to
medical opinions received by prison administrators in evaluating the subjective understandings
for deliberate indifference. See Westlake v. Lewis, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (applying medical deference in deliberate indifference assessment).
90 See Bianco, supra note 89, at 20 (“[T]he courts are inclined to defer to
the prison administrator’s judgment regardless of whether a[n] [incarcerated person] claims that a
policy is in violation of the [incarcerated person’s] rights, or that the regulated material is appropriate.”)
91 See 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (establishing requisite elements incarcerated persons must establish
to warrant judicial relief).
92 See id. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (providing requirements for prospective relief for incarcerated persons). “The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that
such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the
Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal
right.” Id. Additionally, the PLRA requires that a release order be issued by a three-panel bench,
further illustrating the stringent and arbitrary requirements of this rule. Id. § 3626(a)(3)(B) (“In
88
89
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court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety
or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief,” granting
federal courts and prison officials additional discretion to avoid resolving
Eighth Amendment violations in the name of public safety.93 Thus, incarcerated persons face a steep uphill battle in obtaining relief for the potential
violations of their constitutional rights.94
III. FACTS
A.

Circuit Splits

As a result of the adherence to a subjective analysis, federal courts’
application of the deliberate indifference test often varies in its results.95
Several circuit courts are split as to both parts of the test, namely what constitutes a serious medical need, and whether a prison official was subjectively indifferent to this medical need.96 For example, circuit courts have
been unable to come to a consensus regarding whether refusal to provide
surgery for transgender incarcerated persons’ gender dysphoria—distress
caused by discrepancy between person’s sex and gender—constitutes deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment.97 In addition to contradictions among circuits regarding the standard for “serious medical need,”
federal courts across the country have been inconsistently applying the subjective test, ranging in decisions as to what constitutes deliberate indifference based on a prison official’s conduct.98
any civil action in Federal court with respect to prison conditions, a[n incarcerated person] release
order shall be entered only by a three-judge court . . . .”)
93 See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (describing discretion afforded to courts to assess public
safety).
94 See id. (establishing hurdles for incarcerated persons in litigation); Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 835-36 (1994) (outlining deliberate indifference test); see also Merkl and Weinberger,
supra note 2 (discussing inability for incarcerated persons to meet these high burdens).
95 See INADEQUATE MEDICAL CARE – DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE STANDARD, supra note 27
(emphasizing inconsistent application among circuit courts).
96 See id. (discussing inconsistent approaches among both circuit and district courts).
97 See Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 221 (5th Cir. 2019) (holding lack of medical consensus regarding gender dysphoria prevented denial of procedure from being a deliberate indifference subjective violation). The Ninth Circuit, by comparison, held that the lack of treatment was
deliberately indifferent because the surgery was medically necessary. See Edmo v. Corizon, Inc.,
935 F.3d 757, 793 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding medical necessity rendered the prison official’s denial
of the procedure deliberately indifferent).
98 See, e.g., Lowrance v. Coughlin, 862 F. Supp. 1090, 1119 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding refusal to give physician-prescribed operation constitutes deliberate indifference); Meadows v. Huttonsville Corr. Ctr., 793 F. Supp. 684, 688 (N.D.W. Va. 1992), order aff’d 991 F.2d 790 (4th Cir.
1993) (holding forced operation despite lack of permission does not constitute deliberate indifference); Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding forcing incarcerated per-
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Deliberate Indifference During Public Health Emergencies
1.

H1N1

Nevertheless, federal courts have previously been prompted to assess deliberate indifference claims during public health emergencies, particularly during the H1N199 pandemic in 2009.100 Federal courts primarily
avoided resolving inadequate medical condition claims during the H1N1
epidemic by holding that unless prison officials blatantly ignored the H1N1
virus in its entirety, prison facilities’ sanitation practices will not amount to
a subjective deliberate indifference to a serious medical condition, regardless of their actual adherence to medical guidelines.101
Of their notable holdings, federal courts have determined that failing to provide incarcerated persons with necessary vaccinations to prevent
diseases does not constitute deliberate indifference under the Eighth
Amendment, instructing that this practice does not amount to a “subjective”
disregard of known medical risks.102 Furthermore, federal courts have at
times indicated that the mere exposure to the deadly disease does not constitute “a deprivation of basic human needs that was objectively sufficiently
son to work with fractured spine not deliberately indifferent); Aaron v. Finkbinder, 793 F. Supp.
734, 737-38 (E.D. Mich. 1992), order aff’d 4 F.3d 993 (6th Cir. 1993) (concluding failure to record incarcerated person needed insulin on medical chart not deliberately indifferent); Koehl v.
Dalsheim, 85 F.3d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding failure to provide prescription glasses to incarcerated person was sufficiently deliberately indifferent); Ruarck v. Drury, 21 F.3d 213, 217-18
(8th Cir. 1994) (holding delay in calling ambulance for incarcerated person experiencing discomfort not deliberately indifferent); McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1260 (11th Cir. 1999) (delaying medical treatment for severe pain can constitute deliberate indifference).
99 See H1N1 flu (swine flu), MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseasesconditions/swine-flu/symptoms-causes/syc-20378103 (last visited Oct. 10, 2021) (explaining
symptoms of H1N1 or swine flu). H1N1—often referred to as “swine flu”—is a combination of
the H1N1 and H3N2 strains of influenza. 2009 H1N1 Pandemic, CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL
AND
PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/2009-h1n1pandemic.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2021). In 2009, the H1N1 infected 60.8 million people
around the world, thereby resulting in the World Health Organization (“WHO”) declaring H1N1
a pandemic. Id.
100 See, e.g., Ayala v. NYC Dep’t of Corr., No. 10 Civ. 6295, 2011 WL 2015499, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. May. 9, 2011) (evaluating deliberate indifference during swine flu); Jackson v. Rikers
Island Facility, No. 11 Civ. 285, 2011 WL 3370205, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2011) (analyzing
whether swine flu constitutes serious medical risk); Freeman v. Quinn, No. 09-cv-1055, 2010 WL
2402917, at *2-3 (S.D. Ill. June 15, 2010) (declining to acknowledge prison official’s response to
swine flu as deliberate indifference).
101 See Ayala, 2011 WL 2015499, at *2 (“Absent any indication that the defendants ignored
willfully the swine flu outbreak in their facilities, the plaintiff’s infection, though unfortunate, is
insufficient to support an Eighth Amendment claim.”)
102 See Freeman, 2010 WL 2402917, at *3 (“Freeman makes no allegation that any of the
named defendants . . . acted with deliberate indifference in denying him access to the vaccine.”)
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serious.”103 However, public health officials have frequently cited major
distinctions between the COVID-19 virus and the H1N1 virus, leaving
open the question of how courts should resolve deliberate indifference
claims in the context of COVID-19.104
2.

COVID-19

Moreover, given the obtrusive nature of COVID-19,105 federal
courts have been tasked with resolving a significant number of deliberate
indifference claims brought by incarcerated persons.106 As a result of this
litigation influx, the Supreme Court has since been petitioned with the
question of whether prison conditions during COVID-19 violate constitutional protections against cruel and unusual punishment.107
Of the hundreds of COVID-19 related cases brought in both state
and federal court, most are class actions filed by civil rights and advocacy
groups on behalf of incarcerated persons.108 These plaintiffs typically re103 See Jackson, 2011 WL 3370205, at *2-3 (holding “[e]xposure to swine flu, in and of itself, does not involve an ‘unreasonable risk of serious damage to future health.’”)
104 See Similarities and Differences between Flu and COVID-19, CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/flu/symptoms/flu-vs-covid19.htm (last updated June 7, 2021) (discussing differences in severities between common influenza and COVID-19
virus). “COVID-19 seems to spread more easily than the flu . . . . Compared to flu, COVID-19
can cause more serious illnesses in some people . . . .” Id.; see also Kimberly Hickok, How does
the COVID-19 pandemic compare to the last pandemic?, LIVE SCI. (Mar. 18, 2020),
https://www.livescience.com/covid-19-pandemic-vs-swine-flu.html (outlining key distinctions
between swine flu and COVID-19). Officials cite COVID-19’s higher rates of infection and mortality, as well as its significantly more deadly impact on older and immunocompromised individuals as other notable distinctions between the COVID-19 virus and the H1N1 virus. See Hickok,
supra (noting mortality difference of .02% for swine flu and 2% for COVID-19 virus).
105 See
COVID-19, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/dotw/covid-19/index.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2021) (noting COVID-19’s
infectiousness); Coronavirus and COVID-19: What You Should Know, WEBMD,
https://www.webmd.com/lung/coronavirus#:~:text=There%20is%20more%20than%20one,all%2
0came%20from%20bats (last visited Jan. 30, 2021) (explaining symptoms of COVID-19).
“COVID-19 is a disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 that can trigger what doctors call a respiratory
tract infection . . . SARS-CoV-2 is one of seven types of coronavirus . . . .” Coronavirus and
COVID-19: What You Should Know, supra.
106 See Carolyn Casey, Dozens of Prisons Now Face COVID-19-Related Civil Rights Lawsuits, EXPERT INST., https://www.expertinstitute.com/resources/insights/dozens-of-prisons-nowface-covid-19-related-civil-rights-lawsuits/ (last updated Aug. 9, 2021) (discussing prevalence of
COVID-19 lawsuits).
107 See Ariane de Vogue, Supreme Court denies Texas inmates’ appeal in case over Covid19
protections,
CNN
POLITICS
(May
14,
2020,
8:02
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/14/politics/supreme-court-texas-inmates-coronavirusprotections/index.html (introducing various cases regarding prison conditions).
108 See Burton Bentley II, The Growing Litigation Battle Over COVID-19 in the Nation’s
Prisons and Jails, LEXIS+, https://plus.lexis.com/search?pdsearchterms=LNSDUID-ALM-
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quest improved conditions that mirror the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention’s (CDC) requisite protocols.109 In addition, these advocacy
groups frequently request compassionate release for sick or vulnerable incarcerated persons.110 Despite viable arguments advocating for improved
conditions, prison authorities have been able to successfully dismiss many
of these claims, arguing that their responses are severely limited when balanced against the fast-paced nature of the virus, public safety concerns, and
budget limitations.111
C.

The Supreme Court and Recent Developments in Deliberate
Indifference

In Texas, two incarcerated persons filed a class action lawsuit on
behalf of high-risk incarcerated persons, alleging that prison officials’ deliberate indifference to their medical needs resulted in the death of a fellow

AMLAWR20200825THEGROWINGLITIGATIONBATTLEOVERCOVID19INTHENATIONSPRISONS
ANDJAILS&pdbypasscitatordocs=False&pdsourcegroupingtype=&pdisurlapi=true&pdmfid=153
0671&crid=c4151adc-2301-486a-88bb-dddc74606a76 (last visited Oct. 10, 2021) (summarizing
influx of incarcerated persons’ COVID-19 class actions).
109 See Burton Bentley II, supra note 108 (outlining causes of actions raised by incarcerated
persons in class action suits regarding COVID-19).
110 See Meghan Downey, Compassionate Release During COVID-19, THE REG. REV. (Feb.
22, 2021), https://www.theregreview.org/2021/02/22/downey-compassionate-release-duringcovid-19/ (outlining process for applying compassionate release standard to requests made by
individuals due to COVID-19pandemic). Downey further discusses the procedure of compassionate release, noting the difficulty in obtaining these requests. Id. Downey notes that the request initially goes to a warden, who, statistically, deny most requests for release. Id. When raising compassionate release requests during an appeal process or during sentencing, individuals
must still exhaust all administrative remedies. Id.
With the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and its prevalence in prison facilities, many
federal courts have held that the conditions of confinement during the pandemic contribute to the extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying compassionate release.
For example, courts have observed that prisons are “powder kegs for infection” due to
“greater risks of infectious disease spread within detention facilities.” Data kept by the
Bureau of Prisons confirm these concerns, as more than 46,000 federally incarcerated
people—approximately one third of people in federal custody—have tested positive for
COVID-19.
Id. Despite some courts providing compassionate release for incarcerated persons, many motions
are still denied, thus elevating incarcerated persons’ exposure to the virus. See id. (discussing
how compassionate release denial is directly linked to increase in COVID-19 cases).
111 See Bentley II, supra note 108 (noting frequency of dismissals of incarcerated persons’
actions); see also sources cited supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text (discussing deference
afforded to prison officials to maintain order and discipline).
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incarcerated person.112 The Fifth Circuit overruled the district court’s finding of deliberate indifference, holding that the requirements went further
than applicable CDC guidelines, and as such, prison officials were not subjectively aware of the apparent risk.113 The plaintiffs subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court, but their writ was denied.114 While ultimately
agreeing with the Court’s decision to deny the appeal, Justice Sotomayor,
joined by the late Justice Ginsburg, concurred separately to discuss the
prevalence of this issue and the necessary adjustments that must be made to
adequately respond to the mistreatment of incarcerated persons.115 Justice
Sotomayor writes,
It has long been said that a society’s worth can be judged
by taking stock of its prisons. That is all the truer in this
pandemic, where [incarcerated persons] everywhere have
been rendered vulnerable and often powerless to protect
themselves from harm. May we hope that our country’s
facilities serve as models rather than cautionary tales.116
Justice Sotomayor also explicitly “encouraged lower courts to ensure that prisons are not deliberately indifferent in the face of danger and
death.”117 Harsh prison conditions during COVID-19, alongside increased

112 See Valentine v. Collier, 140 S. Ct. 1598, 1598 (2020) (describing factual background of
case and incarcerated persons’ allegations); see also de Vogue, supra note 107 (detailing facts of
suit and reason for filing). The district court held that prison officials were deliberately indifferent based on inadequate conditions of confinement, requiring prison officials to “provid[e] unrestricted access to hand soap and hand sanitizer that contains 60% alcohol in public areas . . . educate and inform [incarcerated persons] about the pandemic . . . provide a detailed plan to test all
[incarcerated persons]” and were ordered to do “extensive cleaning and disinfecting protocols.”
See Valentine v. Collier, 956 F.3d 747, 802 (5th Cir. 2020), aff’d Valentine, 140 S. Ct. at 1598
(outlining district court’s order for relief).
113 See Valentine, 956 F.3d at 802 (describing justification for disposition); see also de
Vogue, supra note 107 (discussing decision on appeal).
114 See Valentine v. Collier, 140 S. Ct. 1598, 1598 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(statement respecting denial of application to vacate stay); see also de Vogue, supra note 107
(noting results of appeal).
115 See Valentine, 140 S. Ct. at 1598-1601 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (writing separately to
stress health concerns for incarcerated persons); see also de Vogue, supra note 107 (elaborating
on Justice Sotomayor’s and Ginsburg’s concurrence).
116 See Valentine, 140 S. Ct. at 1601 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (drawing attention to incarcerated persons’ vulnerabilities); see also de Vogue, supra note 107 (illustrating Justice Sotomayor’s concern in protecting incarcerated persons under Eighth Amendment jurisprudence).
117 See Valentine, 140 S. Ct. at 1599 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (stressing prison officials’
obligations); see also Bentley II, supra note 108 (referencing Justice Sotomayor’s contention regarding prison’s management of COVID-19 under deliberate indifference standard).
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litigation alleging deliberate indifference, warrants a review of whether the
subjective test should still stand.118
The Court recently readdressed deliberate indifference in prisons
during COVID-19 in Barnes v. Ahlman.119 In Barnes, a group of incarcerated persons brought suit against jail officials, alleging that the officials
failed to meet CDC guidelines by not following social distancing standards
and mixing healthy and sick incarcerated persons.120 Among other allegations, the incarcerated plaintiffs alleged that they “were required to clean
the bedding of detainees who tested positive for COVID-19.”121 A California district court judge issued a preliminary injunction in response to the
petition, requiring the jail to, at minimum, meet relevant CDC guidelines.122 Jail officials appealed and requested a stay on the injunction; however, the Ninth Circuit swiftly denied this request.123 Relying on prison
administrative deference, the jail again appealed to the Supreme Court, alleging that they had “largely implemented” CDC guidelines “to the extent
possible.”124 In a 5-4 decision in favor of the jail officials, the Supreme
Court granted a stay on the injunction; however, the Court failed to provide
an explanation of their reasoning.125 Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice

118 See Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 844 (6th Cir. 2020) (finding failure to establish
subjectively unreasonable response fails deliberate indifference test); Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d
1276, 1289 (11th Cir. 2020) (determining subjective response by prison official warrants denial
of injunctive relief); see also Merkl and Weinberger, supra note 2 (alluding to necessity of review
of the subjective element by critiquing deliberate indifference standard).
119 See Barnes v. Ahlman, 140 S. Ct. 2620, 2620 (2020) (granting stay for preliminary injunction).
120 See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 1-6, Ahlman v. Barnes, 445 F. Supp. 3d 671, No. 8:20-cv-835 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2020)
(seeking injunction for inhumane conditions of confinement); see also James Romoser, Siding
with jail officials, court lifts injunction that imposed coronavirus safety measures, SCOTUSBLOG
(Aug. 5, 2020, 11:57 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/08/siding-with-jail-officials-courtlifts-injunction-that-imposed-coronavirus-safety-measures/ (introducing basis for action in
Barnes).
121 See Romoser, supra note 120 (quoting Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Complaint
for Injunctive Relief at 1-6, Ahlman v. Barnes, 445 F. Supp. 3d 671, No. 8:20-cv-835 (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 30, 2020)) (discussing allegations raised in incarcerated persons’ complaint).
122 See id. (summarizing Barnes’ lower court determinations and describing initial order to
remedy COVID-19 mismanagement).
123 See id. (outlining Barnes’ procedural history).
124 See id. (quoting Emergency Application for Stay of Injunctive Relief Pending Appeal of
Denial of Stay Application in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit at 2,
Barnes v. Ahlman, 140 S. Ct. 2620, No. 20A19 (July 21, 2020)) (summarizing arguments in writ
of certiorari filed by prison officials). The jail officials also argued that injunction required
measures not mandated by the CDC and that it was a “micromanagement of local jail procedure.”
Id.
125 See id. at 2620 (granting stay of preliminary injunction); see also Romoser, supra note
120 (referencing holding of Barnes case).
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Ginsburg, vehemently dissented, writing that the decision to grant the stay
was an “extraordinary intervention” of the Court.126 Thus, while touching
on the issue of deliberate indifference and its increasingly concerning impacts on incarcerated persons, the Supreme Court has yet to substantively
address the merits of these claims.127
IV. ANALYSIS
As discussed above, alarming rates of infection and death within
prisons between March 2020 and January 2021 gave legitimacy to many
lawsuits brought by incarcerated persons.128 In March of 2020, the World
Health Organization (WHO) released a statement on COVID-19’s impact
on incarcerated persons and surrounding communities, adding that “prisons, jails, and similar settings. . .may act as a source of infection, amplification, and spread of infectious diseases,” and that “[p]rison health is, therefore, critical to public health,” and requires a “whole-of-government and
whole-of-society approach.”129 Thus, to explicitly disregard the conditions
of incarcerated persons not only violates basic civil rights, but it also endangers surrounding communities and innocent prison officials.130
In addition, the Eighth Amendment has repeatedly been interpreted
to consider conditions of confinement as a part of the cruel and unusual
punishment analysis.131 The Supreme Court noted that “[c]onfinement in a
prison . . . is a form of punishment subject to [judicial] scrutiny under

126 See Barnes, 140 S. Ct. at 2621 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing Court improperly intervened on behalf of jail officials). Overall, Justice Sotomayor perceived the majority’s decision
to be ignorant to the District Court’s valid findings that the staff fell “well short” of implementing
the CDC guidelines. Id.; see also Romoser, supra note 120 (discussing Justice Sotomayor’s issues with grant of stay).
127 See sources cited supra notes 112-127 and accompanying text (commenting on Supreme
Court’s inaction in relation to recent remarks on deliberate indifference in prisons).
128 See Harper, supra note 11 (analyzing lack of response and its implications).
129 See Burton Bentley II, supra note 108 (describing importance of societal change regarding protection of incarcerated persons during COVID-19).
130 See Ollove, supra note 25 (discussing high infection rates in prisons and dangers to surrounding communities).
131 See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87 (1978) (holding inhumane conditions of confinement supported finding of deliberate indifference). The Court noted: “It is equally plain,
however, that the length of confinement cannot be ignored in deciding whether the confinement
meets constitutional standards. A filthy, overcrowded cell and a diet of “grue” might be tolerable
for a few days and intolerably cruel for weeks or months.” Id.; see also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 347 (1981) (finding “[Eighth Amendment] principles apply when the conditions of confinement compose the punishment at issue. Conditions must not involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, nor may they be grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting imprisonment.”)
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Eighth Amendment standards.”132 The Supreme Court elaborated on this
determination in Hutto, holding that prison conditions may result in violations of basic human rights and must comport with “contemporary standards of decency.”133
By refusing to reflect the minimum standards of decency within
prisons, the judicial system has permitted an explicit disregard for incarcerated persons health and safety.134 First, incarcerated persons face a litany
of procedural battles before being able to argue the merits of their claim in
court.135 Moreover, incarcerated persons are next challenged to face a court
that affords significant discretion to prison administrators, and further assess a prison administrators subjective understandings before finding a constitutional violation.136 As a result of this focus on subjectivity, incarcerated persons are continually denied relief for objectively inhumane
treatment while incarcerated.137 Therefore, instead of the two-part deliberate indifference test requiring a subjective assessment of prison officials’
understandings, the Court must adopt a test that exclusively uses an objective approach in order to adequately reflect the Court’s adherence to minimum standards of decency in confinement.138
A.

Practical Issues with Deliberate Indifference

As a result of the Farmer decision, incarcerated persons are now
required to prove that prison officials had “actual knowledge” of “subjective recklessness” before effectively establishing an Eighth Amendment violation.139 Thus, despite being presented with objectively inhumane prison
conditions, prison officials may curb liability based on a lack of “actual
132 See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 345 (quoting Hutto, 437 U.S. at 685) (stating confinement is
form of punishment governed by Eighth Amendment).
133 See Hutto, 437 U.S. at 685 (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102) (maintaining Eighth Amendment interpretations must evolve with time). The Court in Hutto determined that prolonged stays
in isolation confinement cells may constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 680.
134 See sources cited supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text (charting disproportionate
impact on incarcerated persons during COVID-19).
135 See sources cited supra notes 70-83, 91-94 and accompanying text (outlining various procedural and administrative prerequisites to Eighth Amendment claims).
136 See sources cited supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text (describing “substantial deference” afforded to prison officials and subjective element under deliberate indifference test).
137 See sources cited infra note 160 and accompanying text (displaying how objectively meritorious claims fail for inability to overcome subjectively determined “reasonable responses”).
138 See sources cited infra notes 167-178 and accompanying text (discussing adoption of exclusively objective test for deliberate indifference).
139 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 27, Farmer v.
Brennan 511 U.S. 825, 843 (1993) (No. 92-7247)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (holding
two-part test is necessary for deliberate indifference).
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knowledge.”140 The Court in Farmer rejected the notion that a subjective
approach would permit prison officials “to take refuge in the zone between
ignorance of obvious risks and actual knowledge of risks,” holding that a
fact finder could instead determine the official had “actual knowledge” because it was obvious.141 Accordingly, incarcerated persons must prove that
prison officials actually knew of a risk, rather than that prison officials
should have known of a risk.142 Not only is this test plainly illogical considering the Court’s commitment to human decency, but it also perpetuates
an ambiguous test with varying results for litigants.143
1.

State of Mind and Congressional Intent

When adopting § 1983, both Congress and the Court recognized
the incumbent need for a judicial remedy to inhumane and problematic
conduct by government officials.144 However, little Congressional evidence suggests that an “actual knowledge” consideration was intended
when evaluating prison official conduct.145 Upon examining Congress’
legislative history in adopting § 1983, the record is void of concern regarding government officials’ actual knowledge of wrongful conduct; rather,
the legislative history suggests that Congress’ intention in adopting § 1983
was to limit discretionary abuse by government officials that either deliberately or inadvertently infringed upon an individual’s constitutional
rights.146
140 See Sanabria, supra note 69, at 1135 (noting jurisprudential evolution for Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference claims).
141 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 22, 27, Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 843 (1993) (No. 92-7247)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (justifying use of
subjective prong in deliberate indifference test).
142 See id. (emphasis added) (mandating “actual knowledge” test as opposed to objective understandings).
143 See sources cited infra notes 167-178 and accompanying text (discussing adoption of exclusively objective test for deliberate indifference); see Hill, supra note 96 (discussing circuit
court splits under current deliberate indifference test).
144 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (outlining grounds to bring civil cause of action for deprivation of
rights by the State); see also Sanabria, supra note 69, at 1135 (mentioning adoption of § 1983 to
respond to mistreatment by government officials).
145 See Eisenberg, supra note 72, at 485 (providing historical overview of § 1983 adoption).
Eisenberg suggests that while government sought to limit § 1983, their primary focus was curbing
misconduct, writing, “. . . although the 1871 Act dealt with a limited problem, its history suggests
a firm congressional resolve that the problem feel the full effect of federal power, without regard
to traditional limitations.” Id. (outlining main takeaways from article).
146 See id. at 485-86 (assessing historical backdrop of § 1983). To the contrary, a historical
analysis suggests that § 1983 was drafted to aggressively resolve government mistreatment, as it
was adopted under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Id. at 484-85. Of mention on the floor of Congress,
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Despite Congressional intention indicating government mistreatment must be curbed, the Supreme Court insisted upon a more limited
standard when raising claims against government officials.147 Furthermore,
the Supreme Court’s recognition of prison conditions as part of the cruel
and unusual punishment analysis was undermined by the Court’s decision
to also consider prison officials’ state of mind in their Eighth Amendment
determinations.148 By assessing a prison official’s state of mind to determine whether conditions are inhumane, the Court explicitly ignores the objectively wrongful conditions of confinement.149
2.

Burdens on Incarcerated Persons

Accompanying the prerequisite burdens incarcerated persons are
forced to overcome—such as the PLRA, § 1983, or Bivens’ sufficiency arguments—incarcerated litigants must also compile some presentation of
evidence that demonstrates prions officials near-intentionally subjected
them to degrading and substandard conditions.150 Before any judicial remedy is available, an incarcerated person must take several steps to avoid
dismissal of the suit by the PLRA; per the exhaustion requirements of the
PLRA, an incarcerated person must raise inadequate conditions or medical

Sheriffs, having eyes to see, see not; judges, having ears to hear, hear not; witnesses
conceal the truth or falsify it; grand and petit juries act as if they might be accomplices.
In the presence of these gangs all the apparatus and machinery of civil government, all
the processes of justice, skulk away as if government and justice were crimes and
feared detection. Among the most dangerous things an injured party can do is to appeal
to justice. Of the uncounted scores and hundreds of atrocious mutilations and murders
it is credibly stated that not one has been punished.
Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, app. at 78 (1871)).
147 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (failing to delineate clear standard of “actual knowledge” to establish relief); see also Sanabria, supra note 69, at 1116-15 (emphasizing idea that Farmer test fails
to provide any remedy for incarcerated persons’ relief); Eisenberg, supra note 72, at 486 (suggesting congressional intent for § 1983 as covering government mistreatment).
148 Compare Eisenberg, supra note 72, at 485 with Sanabria, supra note 69, at 1123 (juxtaposing scope of Congressional intent and practical execution of § 1983).
149 See Sanabria, supra note 69, at 1135 (determining primary purpose of Eighth Amendment as disregarded under Farmer test).
150 See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3) (defining procedural remedies for relief with respect to incarcerated persons’ prison conditions). The statute specifically states, “[a] party seeking a prisoner
release order in Federal court shall file with any request for such relief, a request for a three-judge
court and materials sufficient to demonstrate that the requirements of subparagraph (A) have been
met.” Id. at § 3626(a)(3)(C) (placing burden on incarcerated persons to produce evidence of violation).
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issues with the prison’s internal grievance systems prior to bringing suit.151
Naturally, these claims often fail to provide any relief because the individual reviewing them is either “. . . an employee of the medical contractor,
such as a colleague of the individual providers whose actions are being reviewed, or a prison administrator whose interests, particularly in controlling costs, are closely aligned with the contractor’s interests.”152 Therefore,
the determinations of the medical provider typically stand, thereby persisting the existence of medical issues for incarcerated persons.153 In addition,
this process is also long and draining for incarcerated persons, as they are
repeatedly forced to undergo additional tests, file additional paperwork,
seek additional referrals, and endure other cyclical administrative procedures.154 Thus, incarcerated persons pursuing the grievance process typically spend months seeking treatment, in what some scholars refer to as “a
giant feedback loop.”155 Finally, the PLRA specifically demands the dismissal of “frivolous claims,” presenting incarcerated persons with an immediate barrier to proving their case.156
If the grievance process fails, then incarcerated persons must make
their best attempt at obtaining judicial relief.157 Based on the subjective

151 See id. § 3626(a)(3)(A)(i)-(ii) (instructing incarcerated persons to surpass administrative
requirements before alleging merits of claim). The statute places the requirements in the negative, instructing that “no court shall enter a prisoner release order unless— . . . .” Id. §
3626(a)(3)(A). This illustrates the emphasis the statute places on refusing release for incarcerated
persons—much in line with the court’s growing precedent. See id.
152 See Thompson, supra note 58, at 649 (providing context to grievance process for incarcerated persons at administrative level). The author further elaborated on the inadequacies in
terms of prison medical care, adding that “the reviewing officials often are not medical professionals. Thus, they are not qualified to question the individual provider’s actions and usually defer to the provider’s medical judgement.” Id.
153 See id. 650 (remarking on medical providers opinions as final).
154 See id. at 649 (introducing other relevant considerations during grievance process).
155 See id. at 649-50 (defining prison administrative process as “feedback loop” for its lack of
resolution).
156 See id. at 650-51 n.41 (describing Estelle’s determination that prison officials were not
deliberately indifferent based on evidence alone); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 108
n.16 (1976) (dismissing complaint outright despite “detailed factual accounting” in complaint
because “[b]y his exhaustive description he renders speculation unnecessary. It is apparent from
his complaint that . . . the doctors were not indifferent to his needs.”)
157 See Thompson, supra note 58, at 650 (commenting on judicial remedy for inadequate
medical care for incarcerated persons).

However, they face an uphill battle. If the provider has taken any action at all, a court
may not be willing to find deliberate indifference. Even if a court undertakes an examination of the adequacy of care, the examination is typically one-sided, pitting a[n] [incarcerated person] without legal counsel or any expert witnesses against a medical provider armed with its own records and expert opinions.
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approach instituted by Farmer, it is difficult for incarcerated persons to
prove violations if prison officials took any steps towards protection.158
For example, prisons that provide some CDC guidelines are often believed
to have “responded reasonably” to the risk of danger posed by COVID19.159
Eighth Amendment claims are further difficult to satisfy given the
requisite showing of “inadequate” medical care, compelling a review of all
medical documents, records, affidavits, and more.160 Furthermore, courts
have expressed a “general reluctan[ce] to second guess medical judgments,” as well as an explicit determination that choice of treatment for incarcerated persons will not constitute deliberate indifference.161 Despite its
exclusion from the Farmer test, courts frequently cite this language to dis-

Id. (describing incarcerated persons’ difficulties raising Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims).
158 See id. (analyzing subjective approach to deliberate indifference claims). Thompson goes
on to discuss the difficulties in establishing a subjective violation, arguing that it provides an outlet for providers to deny mistreatment without any remedy to the incarcerated person.
Providers can use their own records and affidavits to argue that they did not deny all
care to the [incarcerated person] patient and that they did not interfere with any prescribed treatment. However, neither directly addresses the [incarcerated person’s]
claim, which is that the medical care was so inadequate that it constituted deliberate
indifference.
Id. at 650 (discussing subjective setbacks); see also Sanabria, supra note 69, at 1129 (arguing
incarcerated persons limited rights following subjective analysis).
159 See Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 844 (6th Cir. 2020) (holding incarcerated persons
unlikely to establish prison administrators responded unreasonably); Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d
1276, 1289 (11th Cir. 2020) (failing to establish preliminary injunctive relief because prison officials responded reasonably).
There is no question that the BOP was aware of and understood the potential risk of serious harm to [incarcerated persons] at Elkton through exposure to the COVID19 virus. As of April 22, fifty-nine [incarcerated persons] and forty-six staff members
tested positive for COVID-19, and six [incarcerated persons] had died. ‘We may infer
the existence of this subjective state of mind from the fact that the risk of harm is obvious.’ The BOP acknowledged the risk from COVID-19 and implemented a six-phase
plan to mitigate the risk of COVID-19 spreading at Elkton . . . Here, while the harm
imposed by COVID-19 on [incarcerated persons] at Elkton “ultimately [is] not averted,” the BOP has ‘responded reasonably to the risk’ and therefore has not
been deliberately indifferent to the [incarcerated persons’] Eighth Amendment rights.
Wilson, 961 F.3d at 840-41 (explaining reasoning for finding no deliberate indifference).
160 See Thompson, supra note 58, at 652 (mentioning incarcerated litigants’ struggle to obtain medical documents and files while preparing cases).
161 See Westlake v. Lewis, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (acknowledging deference to medical opinions).
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miss prison claims at their early stages.162 In addition, since many of the
claims brought by incarcerated persons are filed pro se, they will likely
lack the funding to obtain sufficient counsel or experts to testify to the inadequate care.163
These hardships are further exacerbated by the impact of COVID19 on prison conditions.164 Due to the unprecedented nature of the virus,
prison officials often attempt to avoid liability by arguing that they are not
well versed in adequate responses to the virus, and that even their minimal
efforts meet the subjective standard proffered under Farmer.165 Given the
sheer number of obstacles regularly faced by incarcerated persons seeking
relief, individuals forced into confinement remained disproportionately
subjected to death during the height of the virus.166

162 See, e.g., Bell, 441 U.S. at 520 (affording deference to prison officials); Overton, 539 U.S.
at 132 (reviewing penological purposes and giving greater weight to prison administrators);
Turner, 482 U.S. at 78 (establishing four-factor test utilized in assessing prison regulations and
appropriate deference); Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21 (concluding substantial deference to prison
officials is appropriate).
163 See Thompson, supra note 58, at 651-52 (describing difficulties incarcerated pro se litigants typically face when alleging Eighth Amendment claim in federal court).

[Incarcerated persons] generally lack the wherewithal to locate a willing expert and the
funds to retain her as an expert witness. A plaintiff’s sworn statement about how she
was treated, without more, stands little chance against the records, affidavits, and expert opinions that the prison medical providers can generate.
Id.
See id. (offering additional struggles amidst prison administration deference); see also
Bellware, supra note 16 (emphasizing inhumane confinement conditions effects on incarcerated
persons). Furthermore, incarcerated persons are not alone in their court claims, with even prison
staff alleging inadequate response. See Bellware, supra note 16.
164

“All of us are trying to survive,” Troitino said. “Your health affects me, and vice versa.
[Incarcerated persons] and staff, we do not feel safe.” Troitino is among the federal
workers suing the government for hazard pay over what they say are risky conditions
they’re forced to work under during the pandemic — but he’s hardly a disgruntled
worker. When the BOP announced Aug. 5 it had moved into Phase 9 of its covid-19
action plan, [incarcerated persons] and their advocates panned the news as the bureau’s
attempt to create the impression that the virus is under control in facilities while papering over a deepening health and safety crisis.
Id. (introducing prison staff’s disapproval of prison facilities).
165 See Thompson, supra note 58, at 649 (listing procedural problems for incarcerated persons prior to court).
166 See Bellware, supra note 16 (“Covid-19 cases are proportionally higher and have spread
faster in prisons than in the outside population.”)
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Adopting an Objective Test for Deliberate Indifference so as to
Embrace “Evolving Standards of Decency”

The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment is
that the treatment of prisoners must meet “evolving standards of decency,”
and that “[a] prison that deprives prisoners of basic sustenance, including
adequate medical care, is incompatible with the concept of human dignity
and has no place in civilized society.”167 Nevertheless, the Court’s permitted use of objective analyses for the deliberate indifference test fully ignores the obvious disproportionate impact of COVID-19 on incarcerated
persons and the few available legal mechanisms for relief.168
The Supreme Court explicitly recognized that in interpreting conditions of confinement, “‘Eighth Amendment judgments should neither be
nor appear to be merely the subjective views’ of judges.”169 As a result, the
Court emphasized that “judgment[s] should be informed by objective factors to the maximum extent possible.”170 As such, the Supreme Court
should restructure their deliberate indifference test to more closely resemble this intention.171
Under an entirely objective deliberate indifference test, the court
would assess: (1) whether there was an objectively serious medical need;
167 See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 511 (2011) (noting deprivation of basic sustenance incompatible with civilized society); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (contextualizing conditions of confinement protections).

These elementary principles establish the government’s obligation to provide medical
care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration. An [incarcerated person] must rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those
needs will not be met. In the worst cases, such a failure may actually produce physical
‘torture or a lingering death,’ the evils of most immediate concern to the drafters of the
Amendment. In less serious cases, denial of medical care may result in pain and suffering which no one suggests would serve any penological purpose. The infliction of such
unnecessary suffering is inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency as manifested in modern legislation codifying the common-law view that ‘(i)t is but just that
the public be required to care for the [incarcerated person], who cannot by reason of
the deprivation of his liberty, care for himself.’
Id. (discussing importance of protecting incarcerated persons from inadequate medical care).
168 See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102 (“The Amendment embodies ‘broad and idealistic concepts
of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency . . .’ against which we must evaluate penal
measures. Thus, we have held repugnant to the Eighth Amendment punishments which are incompatible with “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”)
169 See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S.
263, 275 (1980)) (implementing objective tests for assessing Eighth Amendment claims).
170 See id. (citing Rummel, 445 U.S. at 275) (evaluating beneficial uses of objective analysis).
171 See id. (insisting subjectivity will not adequately resolve cruel and unusual punishment
claims).
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and (2) whether an objectively reasonable prison official was deliberately
indifferent to the risk the medical need poses.172 An objective analysis of
the second prong of the test requires that prison officials be held liable for
risks that are deemed obvious, and also for more nuanced risks that minimal investigative efforts would reveal to such an objectively reasonable
prison official.173 While maintaining the “reasonable response” rather than
an “any response at all” assessment under the deliberate indifference test,
the Court can therefore find minimal efforts by prison officials deliberately
different, even in the face of unprecedented health emergencies.174
As it stands, the subjective element of the approach fails to satisfy
the evolving standards of decency test.175 Applying objective indicia, public opinion is seeking more aggressive responses to COVID-19 by the government and international organizations are calling for a deeper protection
of incarcerated persons.176 Applying subjective indicia, it is clear that a
number of the COVID-19 measures lack proportionality, as all incarcerated
persons are subjected to these inhumane and inadequate medical conditions.177 Where the Court employs a test that is inconsistently applied,
therefore perpetuating inhumane prison conditions, the Court fails to provide any “evolving standard of decency” that they purportedly adhere to.178

See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842-44 (assessing and ultimately rejecting purely
objective analysis). Again, the Court in Farmer relied on standards of criminal recklessness in
making this determination, finding that deliberate indifference requires a “subjective component,”
even when confronted with objectively inhumane conditions of confinement. Id. at 839.
173 See sources cited supra note 68 and accompanying text (commenting on how even obvious risks may not implicate liability if prison official was unaware).
174 See sources cited supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text (noting reasonable response
may be adequate to pass subjective deliberate indifference test).
175 See sources cited supra note 66 and accompanying text (introducing elements of test).
176 See Deane et al., supra note 15 (describing data on public opinion regarding COVID-19).
172

It may seem hard to believe today, but in late March 2020, there was strong bipartisan
support for a variety of government-imposed shutdown measures. At the time, broad
majorities in both parties supported restricting international travel to the U.S., canceling sports and entertainment events, closing K-12 schools, asking people to avoid gatherings of more than 10 people and halting indoor dining at restaurants.
Id.; see also Crimaldi, supra note 15 (outlining worsening health conditions for incarcerated persons during COVID-19 and subsequent calls for action).
177 See sources cited supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing specifically subjective
indicia under evolving standards of decency test).
178 See sources cited supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text (describing elements of
evolving standards of decency test).
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V. CONCLUSION

In sum, COVID-19 has presented the Court with a unique opportunity to address the inhumane medical conditions and blatant mistreatment
of incarcerated persons during public health emergencies—a recognizable
violation of the Eight Amendment. Broadly, the Supreme Court’s failure to
respond to the disproportionate effects of COVID-19 on incarcerated persons ignores the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment commitment to
evolving standards of decency test. Further, the inundation of COVID-19
prison condition litigation within federal courts is indicative of the woefully inadequate confinement conditions. Finally, the series of circuit splits
regarding the test for deliberate indifference also serves as evidence that the
standard itself is unclear, and the test is likely applied both inconsistently
and arbitrarily among courts. Abolishing the subjective approach and adhering to an exclusively objective analysis for deliberate indifference
would allow the Supreme Court not only to resolve an unclear and inadequate test, but it would also usher in a new era of human rights protection
under the Eighth Amendment.
Mary Levine

